Carlos Fonseca Terán
Excerpts from article in Correo de Nicaragua #33 (2014) on the Neoliberal Period
Upon losing political power following its electoral defeat in 1990, Sandinismo rendered Nicaragua the first and only country in the world to undergo the experience of being governed by the Right while simultaneously possessing armed forces and public security agencies under the ideological hegemony of the Left.
Upon regaining power in 2007—following its electoral victory in November 2006—the FSLN became the only leftist force in history to lose power and subsequently regain it; it also became the only such force to have attained power first through armed struggle and later through the ballot box—in each instance, in accordance with the predominant form of struggle within the revolutionary movement, which was, in turn, defined by the prevailing reality.
The Defeat of 1990
[A] factor contributing to the lack of institutionalization of revolutionary power [in the 1980s] was the influential presence of the sector of oligarchic origin within the ranks of the FSLN—a sector that had been indispensable to the revolutionary triumph of 1979. This sector was the very same one that, shortly after the Sandinista electoral defeat of 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, advocated for renouncing anti-imperialism and for abandoning socialism as a societal project and Marxism as a revolutionary theory. It also sought to morally delegitimize the armed struggle waged in defense of revolutionary gains and the lives of Sandinistas in the countryside—even though the entire Sandinista movement rightly agreed on the inadvisability of employing this form of struggle as a means to return to power, at least under the political conditions prevailing at that time.
Daniel Confronts the Waverers
Thus emerged the faction destined to become the self-styled Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS)—a group that, until May 1994, wielded immense influence within the structures of the FSLN. The opposing faction—which championed the historical principles of the revolutionary struggle (even while the entire Sandinista leadership clearly understood that said principles would need to be applied differently under the new circumstances)—was led, surprisingly to some, by Daniel Ortega. Up to that point, Ortega had been perceived as one of the Sandinista leaders least beholden to ideological fundamentalism and dogmatism; on the contrary, he was regarded as one of the most pragmatic figures within the revolutionary leadership. Some time later, Daniel would prove—beyond any doubt—to be the most skilled political strategist and statesman, and the most tactically adept figure, in the history of Nicaragua. This helps explain the pragmatism of his stances under certain circumstances, as well as his ideological intransigence under others.
In the 1980s, those who would later become the “Renovators” not only assumed that bourgeois democracy was the appropriate vehicle for institutionalizing the revolutionary process; in the best-case scenarios, they even regarded it as a stroke of genius—a unique contribution by Sandinismo to revolutionary thought. In this regard, they aligned themselves with sectors that held—and continue to hold—ideological positions similar to their own.
[A] major question that weighs on the mind of any Sandinista is this: had Sandinismo triumphed in 1990—with the counter-revolution still armed and mobilized—how could the Revolution have defended itself? How could it have withstood not only a U.S. military invasion but even a simple counter-revolutionary offensive backed by the United States, given that Sandinismo could no longer count on the Soviet Union, nor on a Cuba that was, at that very moment, in an economic coma—a direct consequence, precisely, of the collapse of the European socialist bloc? At the very least, the manner in which those elections were lost allowed for those gains to be subsequently recovered. Conversely, one must ask whether such a recovery would have been possible had the loss of those gains resulted from a military defeat of Sandinismo.
Regarding the oligarchy, it is necessary to add that its political collapse has not prevented it from continuing to exercise ideological and cultural hegemony in Nicaragua—and, indeed, political power itself—during the 1980s. At that time, it operated by mimicking a sector of Sandinismo that controlled nearly the entire cabinet; subsequently—even without a political party to back its agenda—it went on to control two of the three right-wing governments that held political power in Nicaragua following the Sandinista defeat of 1990 (the administrations of Violeta Barrios and Enrique Bolaños). We are thus dealing with an oligarchy as adept at political survival as Sandinismo itself has become; this is a point to be noted.
The 1994 Congress
Following the electoral defeat of 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the various currents within Sandinismo differed fundamentally from the phenomenon of “tendencies” that had existed during the struggle against the Somoza dictatorship. In the 1990s, these differences became ideological in nature, whereas between 1977 and 1979, the various positions adopted were ideologically indistinguishable from one another.
The decisive moment in which the FSLN defined its revolutionary stance in the face of this new situation was the Extraordinary Congress held in May 1994. This gathering was convened with the express purpose of clarifying positions on the matter, given the antagonism between the two fundamental camps—the “revolutionary” and the “renewalist”—and the inherent incoherence of allowing both to coexist within the FSLN. The result was a resounding victory for the revolutionary positions.
The new strategy consisted of combining popular struggle—in defense of revolutionary gains and sparing no method or form of resistance—with political struggle waged from within institutional spaces to defend popular interests, and electoral struggle as the only viable path toward the reconquest of political power. The new political model centered on direct democracy, while the new socioeconomic model prioritized property directly managed by workers—without abandoning state ownership—and the socialization of property as a means to transform production relations, serving as the fundamental principle for replacing capitalism with socialism. This model was adopted based on the practical experience of the struggle waged by Sandinista workers—supported by Daniel and the revolutionary leaders of the FSLN—to defend their right to directly exercise ownership over the means of production, given the impossibility of defending state ownership under the circumstances prevailing at the time. Orlando Núñez—who had already formulated a series of proposals regarding this matter as early as the 1980s—undertook a theoretical and programmatic systematization of the experiences of these workers during those years of struggle.
Against Neoliberalism
The neoliberal era can be divided into two phases: between 1990 and approximately the year 2000, the FSLN prioritized popular struggle. Once the stability of those socioeconomic gains favoring the popular sectors—which had managed to be preserved up to that point—was secured, priority shifted to the defense and expansion of institutional spaces within the bourgeois-democratic political model—a model ideologically opposed to Sandinismo, yet one that Sandinismo itself had politically established during the 1980s.
Nicaraguan society did not embrace the possibility that the status quo could be altered through peaceful social struggle, but rather believed it could be changed only through political violence or elections; this perception significantly hindered popular struggles aimed at defending revolutionary gains.
The return of Sandinismo to political power—following its electoral victory in 2006—was the direct result of the strategy defined at the Extraordinary Congress of 1994. This outcome was made possible thanks to the efficacy and political acumen with which Daniel Ortega—as the leader of the Sandinista movement—navigated every critical juncture, resolved every crossroads, and applied that strategy with unparalleled tactical vision.
However, suffice it to say that these achievements represent the concrete manifestation of a project for the revolutionary transformation of Nicaraguan society—a socialist model tailored to our specific national reality and to the demands of our era. This project and model are enshrined in a Political Program that emerged from the defense of revolutionary principles during the internal debates that took place within the Sandinista movement in the early 1990s—debates whose ultimate resolution was reflected in the programmatic platform approved at the Extraordinary Congress. For all these reasons, 1994 may be regarded as the year of the FSLN’s refoundation for a new era.
It was during this juncture—one of vital historical and strategic importance—that Daniel Ortega’s leadership was decisively established, as he took the lead in championing revolutionary positions, both within the sphere of popular struggles and in the ideological battle against those advocating for capitulation. The other indispensable factor for the emergence of this leadership has been the fact that Daniel Ortega has played a leading role in the four stages of FSLN history, assuming the position of principal leader during the last two stages—the result of an objective process wherein his leadership qualities developed in response to the challenges imposed by reality. It is, therefore, neither an improvised nor an imposed leadership, but rather the necessary product of a historical accumulation; consequently, Daniel Ortega’s role in guiding the Nicaraguan revolutionary process is the product of a historical necessity.
Chicago ALBA Solidarity 