Infancia Under Siege [Children Under Siege]: Chapter 5, Section 1: Right to Food

Unilateral Coercive Measures against Venezuela have affected the country’s ability to meet the Sustainable Development Goals, a set of approved global goals by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015 to eradicate poverty and build a better future for all. This despite that more than 70% of revenues go to social Investment, Douhan (2021) acknowledged.

According to the United Nations Human Development Report (2020), Venezuela had for 2014 a High Human Development Index, which it maintained in 2019 despite dropping from 74th to 113th place, its index lowering 0.711 points. [1]

[1] Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD). (2020). Informe sobre Desarro-
llo Humano (IDH). República Bolivariana de Venezuela https://hdr.undp.org/Venezuela

Although its social policies have been a retaining wall in the face of a sustained and relentless strategy against the Venezuelan population, children and adolescents are in the line of fire.

 Chapter 5, Section 1- Right to Food

The coercive actions and measures promoted by the United States against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela had a negative effect on the right to food for children and adolescents. The blockade against the petroleum industry led to a decrease in food imports, an action that was aimed at bringing the country to famine. The impact has been mitigated by food programs promoted by the government in conjunction with the organized people’s power, the School Food Program (Programa de Alimentación Escola) that caters for children and adolescents in public education, the Sovereign Field Fairs (Ferias del Campo Soberano) that distribute proteins, fruit, and vegetables at low cost through the Socialist Missions in 1,500 prioritized communities, and Local Committees of Supply and Production (CLAP) which concentrate the largest channel of door-to-door food distribution, with volunteer support from members of the community, and serves 7,500,000 families, which converted the program into a target of sanctions and media campaigns. [2]

[2] Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y la Información. (2023. Marzo, 17). 7
millones 500 mil familias son atendidas por los CLAP. http://www.minci.gob.ve/7-millones-500-
mil-familias-son-atendidas-por-los-clap/

“In September 2017, the transfer to Venezuela of 18 million subsidized food boxes to the CLAP program, is blocked by the U.S. financial system… That same year, a total of 23 Venezuelan financial operations allocated for food, basic supplies, and medicines, were returned by international banks.” (CIIP, 2022).

Other examples that year were JP Morgan’s delaying $28.1 million for the payment of food for CLAPs (Sánchez, 2019) [3],  and Colombian authorities impeding international suppliers from delivering 1700 tons of ham to Venezuela,  to be distributed by the CLAP committees, as part of the typical Venezuelan Christmas meal. (SURES, 2019) [4]

[3] Sánchez, C. (2019). Aceleremos el colapso del gobierno venezolano, aunque matemos a la población de hambre. https://alimentosypoder.com/2019/07/19/aceleremos-el colapso-del-gobierno-venezo-
lano-aunque-matemos-a-la-poblacion-de-hambre/

[4] SURES. (2019). El Bloqueo contra Venezuela es una grave y masiva violación a los derechos humanos a
la salud, alimentación y al desarrollo social del pueblo venezolano. Sures. org.ve. https://sures.org.ve/
wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Bloqueo-salud-alimentacion-y-desarrollo-social.pdf

This hostile measure that violates international pacts would be repeated in 2018 when the Government of Colombia blocked the shipment to Venezuela of 400,000 kilos of food destined for the CLAP program. (The Numbers of the Blockade, 2022).

The UNICEF document (2022) in its analysis of Venezuela, concludes:

“The restrictions on food imports, which account for more than 50% of food consumption, have caused  the steady increase in malnutrition over the past six years, with more than 2.5 million people living in a situation of insecurity and nearly 117,000 children at risk of general acute malnutrition in 2022.” (p. 18).

In the same vein, the report of Special Rapporteur Douhan (2021) makes reference to coping mechanisms that include consuming fewer meals per day (1 or 2, instead of 3); less food and of poorer quality; sale of household assets to obtain food; reduction in health, clothing and education expenditures with the corresponding increase in crises, tensions, violence and separation of the families; increased child labor; participation in the gray economy; criminal activities, including drug and human trafficking; forced labor, and migration. It also highlights that the CLAP food box program suffered from a decrease in the diversity of articles.

Some of the products included in the CLAP box that varied in quantity are rice, lentils or beans, canned sardines, pasta, cornmeal, sugar, coffee, milk, nutrichicha, oil. Between 2017 and 2020, the program reached a distribution of 453,824,225 combos, equivalent to 6,586,329 tons of merchandise distributed. (Venezuela in Figures, 2021, p.181)

The attack on CLAPs is a threat to children’s and adolescents’ right to food “in particular, in 2019, 92% of powdered milk consumed by households came from the Committees, as well as 72% percent of cereals” (Douhan, 2021).

The use of food as a weapon of war is part of the expansionist and imperial history of the United States, witnessed since the second half of the 19th century with the slaughter of buffaloes , the basis of the economy and culture of the Sioux, Kiowa and Comanches, to the use of coercive measures as a policy of extermination.

The concrete expression of this strategy against the right to food of Venezuelans, mainly children and adolescents, and the use of food to cause national destabilization, evidenced by the chronology of the Venezuelan Anti-Blockade Observatory, which includes measures, actions, decisions in the legal, economic and administrative fields, to punish and block the Venezuelan food sector, derived directly or indirectly from the of the Unilateral Coercive Measures imposed by the United States, together with other States during 2019. [5]

[5] Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Economía, Finanzas y Comercio Exterior. Centro Interna-
cional de Investigación Productiva. Observatorio de Medidas Coercitivas Unilaterales. (2021b). Cronología del Bloqueo a los Alimentos. https://observatorio.gob.ve/caso-bloqueo-de-los-alimentos/

In this regard, the following facts are indicated:

May 03

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN), the Office of the U.S. Treasury Department, issues an alert to U.S. Financial Assistance to report suspicious activity on funds associated assets of the Government of Venezuela, limiting operations and transactions related to the CLAP program.

July 18

The Government of Mexico froze the accounts of 19 Mexican companies to the detriment of the proper functioning of the CLAP food assistance program.

July 25

The Treasury Department sanctions ten individuals, related to companies that provide food and goods to Venezuela, under the argument of their establishing an alleged scheme of corruption and “social control” through the CLAP food program.

On the same day, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Treasury Department sanctions diplomat Alex Nain Saab Moran, who was taking steps to ensure that food was obtained for the committees.

August 15

A bank of Turkish origin closes accounts of the Central Bank of Venezuela, blocking a financial channel for the importation and payment of products for CLAP boxes from Turkey.

Also in May 2019, the secretary general of the CLAPs, Freddy Bernal reported that the U.S. government sanctioned 10 of the 12 shipping companies that transported food to Venezuela for the CLAPs. He also denounced the increased shipping time from 20 to 60 days resulting from the transactions  passing through third countries. (Correo del Orinoco, 2019). [6]

[6] Bernal Freddy. (2019, May, 19).  EEUU impide que navieras trasladen alimentos a Venezuela. Correo del Orinoco. http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/freddy-bernal-eeuuimpi-de-que-navieras-trasladen-alimentos-a-venezuela/ 

“The ports of Venezuela are classified as Ports of War, which means higher freight and insurance payments for import and export. All this in a framework where the payment to suppliers tended to become more and more complicated, because of the limitations imposed by international banks on the time to make transfers and the refusal to open Venezuelan government accounts abroad (corresponding banks). Not being able to pay normally by correspondence, the country had to manage to make payments alternatively, e.g. via investment funds, which implied extra expenses in terms of commissions and fines to withdraw the money early. Other times payments were made but with significant delays, and had to keep the funds unpaid while they  took steps to overcome the obstacles. The financial cost overrun has also been due to the use of alternative currencies to the dollar, as dollar transactions were the most blocked, which implies extra conversion costs.” (Celag, 2019).

Referring to CLAPs, in the report of the UN Special Rapporteur Idriss Jazairy, (2018) [7], the program is described as a beneficial initiative for the population. In this context, Jazairy has repeatedly stated that the use of sanctions by outside powers to overthrow an elected government is in violation of all the norms of international law. [8]

The food security of Venezuelans has also been assessed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), which stated that the country has experienced since 2016 the highest hyperinflation in its history, and faces a series of sanctions that have sharpened the internal economic emergency, affecting Venezuelans’ food security and quality of diet. (Sánchez, 2021).

[7] Informe del Experto Independiente sobre la promoción de un orden internacional democráti-
co y equitativo acerca de su misión a la República Bolivariana de Venezuela y al Ecuador (A/HRC/3947/Add.1) (03/08/2018). Alfred de Zayas. Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas. https://reliefweb.int/report/venezuela-bolivarian-republic/informe-del-experto-independien-te-sobre-la-promoci-n-de-un

[8] Idris Jazairy: Sanciones a Venezuela atentan contra los derechos humanos de personas inocen-
tes. (31/01/2019). http://www.minci.gob.ve/idriss-jaairy-sanciones-a-venezuela-atentancon-
tra-los-derechos-humanos-de-personas-inocentes

Likewise, in terms of food production in January 2017, the refusal of a number of financial institutions to process a set of payments by the government of Venezuela, impacted the National Seed Funds Plan amounting to $297 million, affecting production. (The Numbers of the Blockade, 2022).

Between 2018 and 2019, 24 to 30 million tons should have been produced, but was reduced 50% due to the theft of the company Monómeros by the government of former Colombia President Iván Duque. (Telesur,2020) [9]

[9] Cinco sectores que afecta el bloqueo de EEUU. a Venezuela (2020, Septiembre 29). Telesurtv. https://www.telesurtv.net/news/bloqueo-venezuela-danos-20200929-0017.html

[10] Sánchez, C. (2020, Julio, 06). Lo que hay detrás del bloqueo de EE.UU. a la agricultura venezolana. Alimentosypoder.com. https://alimentosypoder.com/2020/07/06/lo-que-hay-detrás-del-boqueo-de-eeuu-a-la-agricultura-venezolana.

Similarly, the decrease in the supply of fuel as a result of the blockade of our refineries and our access to diluents, affected the use of tractors and machinery in the field and the distribution of seed, fertilizer, animal feed, and agricultural production. These are activities necessary to ensure a sovereign, healthy and sustainable diet of good quality; and also proteins and nutrients for the physical and mental development of children and adolescents.

It should be noted that in the context of unconventional warfare against Venezuela, the fall in domestic production that it induced was also caused by U.S. agro-export business, which cut Venezuela’s importation of commodities (wheat, corn, rice and sorghum), and promoted opening new markets and trading partners thanks to their migration to Colombia, Peru and Ecuador, which favored transnational agro-business. (Sánchez, 2020) [10]

[10] Sánchez, C. (2020, Julio, 06). Lo que hay detrás del bloqueo de EE.UU. a la agricultura venezolana. Alimentosypoder.com. https://alimentosypoder.com/2020/07/06/lo-que-hay-detrás-del-boqueo-de-eeuu-a-la-agricultura-venezolana.

A fundamental aspect that reflects the impact of this collective punishment in children’s right to food was the dramatic decline in food imports by almost 90% in 2019, which increased the Undernourishment Prevalence Index of the population from 6% in the 2014-2015 period to 12% in 2019. (INN, 2019, p,179)

[11] Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Planificación (2021, Enero). Índice de Prevalencia de Sub-alimentación (IPS). 1990-2019. Venezuela en Cifras. Nuestra transición al socialismo. http://www. mppp.gob.ve/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Venezuela-en-cifras-2021-26-enero-1.pdf

The relationship between unilateral coercive measures registered by the Anti-Blockade Observatory of Venezuela and the Undernourishment Prevalence Index. This is reflected in the table  of the Corporate Statistical Database (FAOSTAT) prepared by Clara Sánchez (2022).

Figure NO 7.

Source: Clara Sánchez Guevara (2022)

The index is an Indicator (2.1.1) of the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations, which estimates the proportion of the population facing severe food deprivation. It is derived from official information at the national level on the supply and consumption of foodstuffs and energy needs.

This is part of Goal 2: Hunger and Food Security in Target 2.1, which sets out to end hunger by 2030 and ensure access for all people (particularly the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including children under the age one) to a healthy, nutritious and sufficient diet throughout the year.

Target 2 of the Sustainable Development Goals is based on the premise that optimal nutrition is the foundation children’s survival, health and development. Children who are well-fed are better able to grow and learn, to participate in their communities, and to resist disease, disasters and other situations of emergency. Almost half of the deaths of children under 5 years of age that are recorded around the world can be attributed to undernourishment.

In the analysis of the Sustainable Development Goals in the framework of the Forum of the Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean on Sustainable Development 2030 Agenda, convened by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) defines that “food insecurity is a human rights and economic development issues. Its presence in countries with a high proportion of food is a clear example of inefficiency of inequality”. [12]

In FAO’s annual report, The State and Food Security in the World (2019), identifies the increase in the Venezuelan population that lacks sufficient dietary energy to lead a healthy life from 2.8 million people in 2004-2016 to 6.8 million people in 2016-2018. (FAO, 2019, p. 149). [13]

In the 2021 report, in the country the number of undernourished people increased to 7.8 million during 2018-2020. (FAO, 2021, p. 161). [14]

This contrasts with the initial indicators of the National Plan for Human Rights (2016-2019) in Venezuela without sanctions from  2014:

“In the area of the right to food, a network of the state’s food supply that enabled the increase in the number of meals per day for the Venezuelan population,  and consequently, the increase in daily caloric intake, the reduction of child malnutrition, and reduction of hunger. Venezuela is currently in 4th place in the region with improved availability of dietary energy and higher levels of malnutrition. Today, the average Venezuelan child has the stature of the richest child of the Fourth Republic, evidence of progress in reducing inequality. 96.2% of the Venezuelans eat more than three times a day.” [15]

[12] 12 Naciones Unidas (S/F). Foro Político de Alto Nivel de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Desarrollo Sostenible. Agenda 2030 en América Latina y el Caribe. https://agenda2030lac.org/es/ods/2-hambre-cero

[13] FAO, FIDA, OMS, PMA, UNICEF. (2019, Julio, 1). El Estado de la Seguridad Alimentaria y la Nutrición en el Mundo (SOFI) 2019. Roma, FAO. https://www.fao.org/publications/home/fao-flagship-publications/the-state-of-food-security-and-nutrition-in-the-world/es

[14] FAO, FIDA, OMS, PMA y UNICEF. 2021. El estado de la seguridad alimentaria y la nutrición en el mundo 2021. Transformación de los sistemas alimentarios en aras de la seguridad alimentaria, una nutrición mejorada y dietas asequibles y saludables para todos. Roma, FAO. https://doi.org/10.4060/cb4474es

[15] 15 Consejo Nacional de Derechos Humanos. (S/F). Plan Nacional de Derechos Humanos (2016-2019). http://www.cne.gov.ve/web/imagen/publicidad/2016/dh2016-2019.pdf

The country was recognized by FAO in 2015 for “its remarkable progress and exceptional in the fight against hunger”, decreasing to less than one million people who have been suffering from hunger since 1990. Coercive measures significantly altered the rate of growth of the nation and in doing so, they violated the population’s right to food, especially that of the children and adolescents.

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