The increasingly less covert US military deployment, ostensibly under the guise of an “anti-drug operation,” has the clear objective of regime change in Venezuela. The scenarios range from a direct military attack against the national government to the creation of an internal rupture, accelerated by mercenaries hired from Washington, that would shatter the cohesion of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB), among other effects.
The Venezuelan population has reacted in a way that is, perhaps, unexpected by the global media exerting psychological pressure on them. There is no visible unrest in the streets, and, as those same media outlets have reported, the majority rejects foreign intervention in the country. Many questions arise from this social behavior, requiring an analysis of the factors that might help answer them.
The scenarios proposed for a regime change
Recently, the first scenario has been attempted through false flag operations, such as those orchestrated from Guyana. On several occasions, armed actors have provoked confrontations with security forces from this neighboring country, which occupies the Essequibo region, in order to establish a casus belli that would lead to a US military occupation.
It is well known that Secretary of State and Acting National Security Advisor Marco Rubio intends to use the territorial dispute over Essequibo as a trigger for this scenario. Furthermore, the hypothesis that the recent flights of US fighter jets, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft are intended to provoke reactions—or errors—from the Venezuelan Armed Forces (FANB) to justify this being a trigger for military escalation.
The media-savvy opposition figure Maria Corina Machada ostentatiously displays her desire for internal strife within the Venezuelan military. The rhetoric she employs includes creating excessive anxiety that foreshadow scenes of mass military desertion “in search of redemption.” In contrast, last week the New York Times revealed that Trump “is reluctant to approve operations that could endanger U.S. troops or result in an embarrassing failure,” which, if true, is understandable.
The second scenario attempts to replicate the violent escalations of 2014 and 2017, adding the element of criminal gangs, as was tested on July 29, 2024, after the presidential elections. The failed swarming tactic consists of creating virulent hotspots in different regions of the country through the use of weaponry to create conditions that lead to the first scenario.
Establishing the narrative of a “repressive Venezuelan government” serves Washington—and the opposition it sponsors—to activate the well-established mechanisms of color revolution that, as in Libya and Syria, pave the way for the militarization of the conflict under the guise of defending civilians. In both cases, with their various ramifications and variations, the population plays a decisive role.
The role of the Venezuelan population in a war scenario
The reasons for the internal rupture are complex because the opposition has lost political influence and, consequently, its ability to mobilize support, but also because terrorist plots aimed at creating chaos have been consistently dismantled. Furthermore, actors infiltrated within the country have been detected and neutralized, in many cases with the help of intelligence by the people, that is, information from the civilian population.
On the other hand, when the militaristic threat of the Trump administration increased, the Venezuelan government called on the people to enlist to “transition from a peaceful revolution to an armed revolution.” This transition relies on the Bolivarian National Militia, created by Commander Hugo Chávez in 2009 as a volunteer corps, a civilian complement to the FANB (National Bolivarian Armed Forces), with the objective of defending national sovereignty and peace. What for years functioned as an auxiliary body formalized its role in 2020 when it was elevated to the status of the fifth component of the FANB, giving it unprecedented institutional weight.
President Maduro has stated that Venezuela’s strategy in the face of threats from the United States is “primarily defensive,” encompassing “diplomatic and political struggle.” However, he warned that if “Venezuela were attacked, it would immediately enter a period of armed struggle in defense of the national territory” and “constitutionally declare the republic in arms.” This is a military strategy of irregular resistance that, based on Bolivarian doctrine, assumes that, just as the Liberator mobilized entire populations against an empire, Venezuela is called upon to resist any foreign power through a total mobilization of its citizens.
In this regard, the Vice President for Political Affairs, Citizen Security, and Peace, Diosdado Cabello, described the strategy for a potential conflict as “not conventional warfare. It’s a different kind of war, and we have to move to that phase and prepare ourselves.” He added, “We’re going to wage it in every part of the country, on every terrain, on every front, and with whatever resources we have at hand.”
Are there conditions ripe for social confrontation?
The socio-economic difficulties, a consequence of the blockade and sanctions, have been viewed by Washington as a breeding ground for social discontent to carry out its destabilizing work in a hidden way without having to resort to an armed invasion.
The Venezuelan government has implemented various strategies for national economic stabilization and is not without its challenges in this area. It has also addressed the socio-political front by deepening actions that strengthen the organizational fabric of grassroots power.
In this regard, the government has redirected social investment and allocated resources to be managed by grassroots social organizations. To this end, Bolivarian Integral Base Committees (CBBIs) have held national popular consultations, beginning with a series of community meetings, or citizens’ assemblies, in which the people propose priority projects to address the collective problems of their communities. These range from the construction of schools and street lighting to support for community-based businesses.
Based on their own concrete proposals, each CBBI commune or communal circuit chooses the project to be implemented and then manages the allocated resources. The concept aims at community self-governance and seeks to territorialize the exercise of democracy based on Articles 5 and 62 of the Constitution, as well as establish conditions to achieve the so-called “fourth transformation” envisaged in the 7T Plan, which is the 2025-2031 government plan. Some facts:
- During 2024, two National Popular Consultations were held, the first on April 21 and the second on August 25; these reflected 2,259 water projects, 1,319 road projects, 1,239 habitat projects, 1,153 electricity projects, 873 education projects and 798 sanitation projects.
- On February 2nd of this year, 36,685 initiatives proposed by the People’s Power throughout the national territory were voted on, and the formation of the popular self-government centers began in order to achieve direct contact between the central government and the 5,334 communal circuits.
- On April 27, during the second National Popular Consultation of 2025, 36,612 proposals were submitted nationwide, and voting took place in 5,718 polling stations across the country. At that time, the Minister of Communes, Ángel Prado, stated that Venezuela had invested $148 million in communities over the course of a year and had consolidated 14,000 projects.
- On July 27, the third National Youth Council of the year was held, focusing on projects submitted by young people. A week later, President Maduro reported that, up to that date, 23,455 projects had been approved by vote, 70% of which had already been completed by the communities themselves and “delivered as works that positively impact schools, housing, health centers, access roads, local infrastructure, among other areas.”
- The fourth National Popular Consultation of the Bolivarian Integral Base Committees will be held on November 23. The president announced that 13% of the projects are for economic entrepreneurship and production; 42% are focused on public services such as roads, water, electricity, health, and education; 5% on security; 27% are for social programs; 5% are for justice of the peace and community centers; and 6% are for scientific projects.
Faced with the rightwing opposition hope to create an internal conflict, the population is making progress in improving collective living conditions through popular organization and the exercise of territorial politics; this minimizes the conditions for social confrontation because political differences are resolved through dialogue and the collective construction of solutions.
The National Popular Consultations of the Bolivarian Integral Base Committees, as local development plans, allow for the deepening of participatory democracy and the revitalization of leadership for political representation and the construction of new social consensus.
What remains of the US “humanitarian” excuse
The war against Venezuela is not a recent issue. In any confrontation, it is necessary to surround the target and cut off its supplies: the goal of the sanctions and blockade measures implemented by the United States.
These measures harmed the health and nutrition of the population. Researcher Clara Sánchez has highlighted that, starting in 2015, malnourishment reappeared and increased “proportionately to the number of unilateral coercive measures imposed.” She adds that, according to the FAO, this scourge reached its highest level in 2019.
The ongoing regime change operation was anchored in the narrative of a food crisis as a “channel to carry out a ‘humanitarian’ military intervention in the country, endorsed by the international community,” while sectors of the extremist opposition stole national assets in collusion with the Trump and Biden administrations. But the “complex humanitarian emergency” narrative failed, so both the opposition and its allies in Washington shifted gears and are now criminalizing those they considered victims less than two years ago: Venezuelan migrants.
Last September, President Maduro announced that the country has food reserves equivalent to 101 days of consumption, the highest figure in the nation’s history. He added that the country produces and supplies 100% of the food consumed domestically, while also generating a surplus that allows for exports.
The economy has been growing for 18 consecutive quarters, and this recovery, which is due to a strategy based on the 13 Productive Engines that combine structural recovery in sectors that have traditionally sustained the economy, such as hydrocarbons, with the incorporation of other non-traditional sectors.
The farming and fishing sectors, part of the social base of food production, have contributed strengths in the food sector:
- With the participation of both sectors, undernourishment decreased from 17.6% between 2021 and 2023 to 5.9% between 2022 and 2024. This represents a recovery of more than 66%.
- The national primary production of plant and animal food has not stopped growing in the last six years and in 2024 it rose to 6.2%.
- Venezuelan farmers have increased coffee exports by 500% in the first half of the year, compared to the previous year, demonstrating the sector’s capacity to export.
- Last September, 15,400 peasant councils were revitalized and, in assemblies, they elected their respective spokespeople for organization and training, productive economy, and territorial defense and national sovereignty.
- Malnutrition in children under 5 years of age fell from 14.8% in 2019 to 1.2% in 2024, according to the World Health Organization (WHO).
- Fishing activity and industrial processing in the fishing sector has increased by over 7% this year.
- The products of “Blue Venezuela” —fishing and aquaculture— have reached 33 countries, with a 225% increase in their international marketing.
Organization in food-producing sectors such as fishing has generated results that dismantle the “humanitarian excuse”
Faced with internal upheaval induced by external factors, the antidote has been the building of popular participation in comprehensive security and defense, increased local political participation, and food sovereignty. This results from a social cohesion based on collective achievements, the deepening of governance practices, and the division among anti-Chavista sectors.
The attempt to dismantle the Bolivarian Republic remains in force in an extremist sector that opted for anti-politics and that assumed the so-called “electoral route” as a device to sharpen the confrontation and seek the implosion of electoral participation.
A broader perspective gives a clearer understanding of the results: extremism has lost influence among its followers; its errors are as evident as the foreign elites sponsorship and leadership over the extremist opposition. Their agendas have become detached from the people, and it would seem that María Corina Machado’s capitulationist promises to these elites confirm this.
Chicago ALBA Solidarity 
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